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Abstract— Highly automated, cooperative driving vehicles 
will allow for a more fluid flow of traffic, resulting in more 
efficient, eco-friendly and safe traffic situations. The automotive 
industry however, is safety critical and current safety standards 
were not designed to deal with cooperative driving. In this paper, 
we apply a modern safety analysis method, Systems-Theoretic 
Process Analysis, in the context of cooperative driving as part of 
the Grand Cooperative Driving Challenge (GCDC) and present 
our reflections on the method. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The second edition of the Grand Cooperative Driving 
Challenge (GCDC) will be held in May 2016. It is a 
competition aiming to speed up real-life implementation of 
cooperative driving. Cooperative driving will optimize traffic 
flow, reduce emissions and increase safety. KTH Royal 
Institute of Technology is competing in the GCDC with two 
vehicles: A Research Concept Vehicle (RCV) and a Scania 
truck. Since the automation of propulsion functionality is 
highly safety critical, a thorough safety analysis is required. In 
this case, the analysis has been performed using Systems-
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). 
A Cooperative Driving Module, responsible for control of 
the vehicle and for communicating with surrounding vehicles, 
is currently being designed at KTH. This will be instantiated 
in both the vehicles individually for implementation. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper on 
STPA in a cooperative driving context. As such, the unique 
contributions of this paper are (1) analysing the benefits of 
applying the STPA method in this context and (2) sharing of 
the experiences from our work. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section II sets the background and describes the GCDC, the 
RCV, automotive safety and the STPA method. Section III 
describes the given task and the process followed. Section IV 
presents the preliminary findings, and section V discusses the 
process and gives the authors’ reflections of the STPA process 
as well as a description of future work. 
II. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK 
A. Grand Cooperative Driving Challenge 
Ten university teams are scheduled to compete in the 
upcoming edition of GCDC, organized by the i-GAME 
research project [1]. For all vehicles, cooperation is to be 
achieved through vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-
infrastructure communication, from here on referred to 
collectively as V2X, which utilizes the work being done in 
Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS), facilitated 
by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI). The competition includes three scenarios. Two for the 
actual competition and one for demonstration purposes. All 
scenarios are to be performed with consideration of comfort 
and safety of passengers in mind without unnecessary loss of 
speed. The scenarios include (1) the merging of two convoys, 
(2) a T-intersection and (3) yielding to prioritised vehicles, 
such as an ambulance, as the demonstration scenario [2]. 
B. Research Concept Vehicle 
The RCV, shown in Fig. 1 is a drive-by-wire electric 
vehicle developed at the Integrated Transport Research Lab 
(ITRL) at KTH with the purpose of validating and 
demonstrating current and future research. It is based on the 
concept of “autonomous corner modules”, i.e. wheels with 
built-in electric hub motors and actuators for active camber tilt 
and yaw control of each wheel. The addition of a battery and a 
central computing unit to control the modules, results in a 
fully electric drive train. The vehicle, in its current design, can 
reach a top speed of approximately 55 km/h on a flat surface. 
In order to comply with the GCDC communication standards, 
the RCV will be fitted with a Vehicle Intelligent Transport 
Systems Station. 
 
Fig. 1. Research Concept Vehicle 
C. Automotive Safety 
The best practices in automotive functional safety today 
recommend complying with the ISO-26262 standard [3]. This 
standard is currently applicable to vehicles that include at least 
one electrical and/or electronic (E/E) system in series 
produced passenger vehicles up weighing up to 3500 kg. The 
standard concerns the functional safety of E/E systems. 
Regarding the concept phase of the lifecycle, ISO-26262 
requires: A hazard analysis, a risk assessment and an 
Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) determination [4], 
the purpose of which is to develop a safe vehicle. Following 
the ISO-26262 safety lifecycle, a safety analysis is to be 
conducted. The objective of which is to investigate the 
consequences of faults and failures, and to identify new 
hazards that were not detected during the hazard analysis [5]. 
Some examples of methods advocated by the standard are 
Hazards and Operability analysis (HAZOP) [6], Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) are explained in greater detail in [7]. However, the 
concept of cooperative driving is relatively new, and neither 
the ISO-26262 nor these techniques, were designed with a 
scope of multiple vehicles in mind. Designing systems for 
cooperative driving poses different challenges than singular 
vehicles from a safety viewpoint. 
D. STPA 
Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a safety 
analysis method developed by Nancy Leveson as a response to 
the raising complexity and software dependencies of modern 
products. In her book, Engineering a Safer World [8], she 
argues that traditional causality models are based on chains of 
failures, and that traditional safety analysis methods try to 
ensure safety by preventing these failures. This is, according 
to her, becoming an outdated way of thinking about safety 
since modern products are so complex that undetected design 
flaws are a real safety issue. Components may function as 
intended, and nothing may fail, but the system could still be 
unsafe due to unforeseen behaviours caused by the complex 
interactions between components and subsystems. This 
scenario is of particular importance to consider in the context 
of cooperative driving since all vehicles, need not necessarily 
even be designed by the same company, while their 
interactions are essential to provide collaborative functioning.  
STPA is based on the causality model Systems-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP), which is in turn 
based on systems engineering. Before the STPA process can 
begin, a STAMP model must be created. This includes first 
defining accidents to avoid and hazards that could cause them. 
Then, the hazards are translated into high-level safety 
constraints (SC) that can be used as aid in the making of a 
preliminary architecture. To complete the STAMP model, the 
functionality then needs to be represented as a control 
structure. A control structure consists of one or more control 
loops consisting in turn of a controller, which is controlling 
some process through actuators, getting feedback through 
sensors. The means by which the controller is controlling the 
process are called control actions. A generic control loop is 
illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Simplified standard control loop 
The process of STPA consists of two steps. The first step 
corresponds to a hazard analysis. Its purpose is to determine 
when a specific control action can lead to a hazard and thereby 
to a defined accident. The control actions of each control loop 
are checked against four different ways in which the action 
could potentially lead to a hazard. If a scenario exists in which 
a control action could lead to a hazard, then that control action 
is considered unsafe. The four ways an unsafe control action 
(UCA) could be termed unsafe are:  
a) If providing a control action would lead to a hazard.  
b) If not providing a control action would lead to a 
hazard. 
c) If providing a control action too early / too late / out 
of sequence would lead to a hazard. 
d) If providing a control action for too long / stopped 
too soon would lead to a hazard. 
UCAs, when identified, are reformulated into SCs. The 
second step of STPA corresponds to a causal analysis. The 
purpose of this step is to find all potential causes of the UCAs 
derived from STPA step 1. The reason why it is not referred to 
as a fault analysis is to emphasise the fact that failures are not 
the only potential causes. Hence STPA step 2 is more than just 
a fault analysis. When causes are identified, measures to 
mitigate them are to be taken. If such measures are not 
possible, then STPA step 2 can be iterated until the causes are 
broken down sufficiently, such that they can be dealt with. 
Fig. 3. visualises the STAMP-STPA process.  
Researchers have previously studied STPA in the 
automotive context. For example, Kawabe and Yanagisawa 
applied STPA on the human interaction with a four-wheel 
drive power-train, and found that it was a much faster process 
compared to the other alternatives [9]. Abdulkhaleq and 
Wagner applied STPA to a cruise control prototype, linking 
together STPA code level safety verification [10]. 
 
Fig. 3. Overview of the STPA process 
Other related work include Asare et al. who formalised a 
more rigorous framework for STPA part 1, called FSTPA-I, to 
make the STPA process less ambiguous [11]. 
III. TASK AND STPA PROCESS DESCRIPTION 
The task to conduct a safety analysis of the Cooperative 
Driving Module is a joint task of two different studies. The 
first studies how STPA could be adapted into the ISO-26262 
lifecycle, and comparing the impact of safety analysis on the 
architecture of the vehicle, on the basis of the scope and the 
context of the analysis (singular vehicle context versus a 
cooperative multi-vehicle context). 
The second study takes a closer look at the safety aspects 
involving the driver. The work aims to answer how system 
modes, driving mode switching and safety related HMI 
aspects can be identified and quantified using the results 
obtained with the STPA method in the first task as well as 
how these aspects of the cooperative functionality should be 
presented to the driver. 
Both projects use the same real world cases for validation; 
the development of the RCV and the Cooperative Driving 
Module. It implements communication with other vehicles 
though V2X, as specified by the C-ITS standard [12], with 
some extensions developed by the i-GAME project [13]. 
Based on the input from vehicle sensors and the cooperative 
effort of the surrounding vehicles, the purpose is longitudinal 
and lateral control over the vehicle. Since these are safety 
critical functionalities, a safety analysis covering the 
cooperative driving module is required for participation in the 
GCDC.  
The safety analysis method of choice, STPA, was chosen 
because it is a relatively new method (2011) that has not been 
studied in great detail in the automotive context, and it was 
developed to match the complexity of modern software 
intensive products [8], unlike the other alternatives mentioned 
in the background section which were designed in the 1950s 
and the 1960s. Even though STPA covers a broad view of 
system safety including environmental and organisational 
changes, the scope was limited to functional changes only for 
this study. 
The analysis was led by the two primary authors of this 
paper, and conducted in collaboration with the RCV 
development team at ITRL and two safety experts (who are 
co-authoring this paper) from the mechatronics division at 
KTH. Workshops were held with the development team 
regarding the accidents and hazards definitions, the STPA 
Step 1 and the STPA Step 2, with intermediate analysis 
sessions by the lead analysts. During these sessions the project 
leader and lead architect provided continuous feedback and 
verification of the analysis. The number of workshop 
attendants was between four and six, depending on the specific 
workshop. 
IV. FINDINGS 
 To initialize the STPA process, accidents were defined for 
the RCV’s participation in the GCDC scenarios. Each accident 
was then broken down into hazards, resulting in seven primary 
hazards. The accidents and hazards considered can be seen in 
Table 1.  
TABLE I.  DEFINITIONS OF ACCIDENTS AND HAZARDS 
 
     Each hazard was then translated into corresponding high 
level SCs for the system. After iterative development together 
with the team developing the extended functionality of the 
RCV, an architecture model of the cooperative module was 
created which defines the system and the functionalities to be 
analyzed. At the top level, the system architecture consists of: 
Accidents Hazards 
A1 
Collision with 
vehicle 
H1 
Inadequate distance to frontal 
vehicle 
H2 Inadequate distance to rear vehicle 
H3 Inadequate distance to side vehicle 
A2 
Collision with 
environment 
H4 
Inadequate distance to frontal 
environmental object 
H5 
Inadequate distance to side 
environmental object 
A3 
Driver G-force too 
high 
H6 Acceleration too strong 
H7 
Deceleration to strong 
 
• A perception functionality responsible for estimating 
the state of the vehicle and of the surrounding vehicles. 
• A ‘world model’ which acts as an onboard logger and 
database, containing state estimates. 
• A router to route V2X transmissions. 
• A supervisory control functionality, which has the main 
responsibility of high level decision making and control. 
• An agent controller, hosting various control agents, 
which controls the platform (ego-vehicle). 
• A gateway to separate the communication internal to the 
cooperative driving module, from the rest of the ego-
vehicle. 
• An HMI for driver input / output. 
The supervisory controller controls the system by 
configuring the agent controller, and activates the appropriate 
control agents, depending on the situation. These control 
agents in turn send reference values to the low level drivers of 
the Ego-vehicle. Sensor data from the platform is fused with 
 incoming communication from other vehicles in the 
perception layer to create an estimate of the state of the 
vehicle and its surroundings. All estimates and received 
transmissions are being stored in the world model and can be 
accessed when needed. The cooperative module is delimited 
by: the gateway towards the own vehicle, the router towards 
other vehicles and the HMI towards the driver. The modelled 
architecture can be seen in Fig. 4.  
All relevant controllers and corresponding control loops in 
the system were identified. Nine control loops were defined: 
driver to supervisory controller, and eight loops related to sub 
functions of the agent control functionality and the 
supervisory controller or low level control.  
STPA Step 1 was performed in collaboration with domain 
experts during two workshops, resulting in 98 UCAs. For 
example, one detected UCA was: “Supervisory controller not 
providing a reference vehicle when activating the cooperative 
adaptive cruise control agent”. That is, the adaptive cruise 
control would not receive a target vehicle to adapt the speed 
to, which could lead to hazards H1, H2, and H3 (See Table 1) 
The remaining UCAs were translated into SCs, which were 
considered equivalent to ISO-26262’s safety goals, and 
assigned ASILs assessing: Severity (S0-S3), exposure (E0-E4) 
and controllability (C0-C3) to match the ISO-26262 process. 
Due to the relative top speed of 60 km/h in scenario two and 
the lack of personal safety features such as airbags on the 
RCV, a majority of the SCs were given the highest severity 
level S3, meaning possibly life threatening injuries. Exposure 
level was set at E4 for most constraints seeing that practically 
all analyzed controllers are used in performing every scenario 
in the competition, resulting in a high probability of exposure. 
All considered SCs were given a controllability level of C3 
since the system is designed to ideally perform the scenarios 
without driver interaction and no backup systems currently 
exist. As a result, the SCs were with few exceptions all 
assigned ASIL D, which is the integrity level that corresponds 
to the highest harm [4]. 
The findings in step 1 were put through step 2 of the STPA 
process in collaboration with experts analyzing each UCA and 
looking at the related control loop to reveal any causal factors 
and/or specific scenarios which could result in unsafe control 
of the vehicle. One example of an identified causal scenario 
for the UCA mentioned in the pervious example is if the both 
the V2V communication and the perception functionality 
would fail at the same time causing the own estimate of 
surrounding vehicles to be wrong at the same time as their 
communication not reaching through. 
All resulting SCs related to specific control loops, 
controllers and control actions were presented to the RCV 
development team to be taken into consideration during 
further development together with a list of recommendations 
for future work concluded from the results of the causal 
analysis. These recommendations highlighted the parts and 
issues of the system in which flaws or errors would often 
appear in the second step of the analysis and could be involved 
in contributing to a large number of UCAs. For example; the 
system in its current state is in need of some way of detecting 
loss of traction. 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results from the STPA analysis has been submitted to 
the GCDC organizers for a review before the competition. We 
will in this section discuss the results and give our own 
reflections of the process that we conducted.  
The high level SCs derived from the system level hazards 
were in this case not used to form a basis for the concept 
Fig. 4. System architecture of the cooperative module 
architecture since a preliminary, although not complete, 
architecture already existed. 
The preliminary system level architecture changed several 
times during the control structure creation process. As parts of 
the control structure were verified flaws were detected and the 
architecture had to be reviewed. Due to the agile work style of 
the development team, these flaws and many identified UCAs 
could be addressed on the fly through architectural changes. It 
is our opinion that the STPA process quickly refined and 
improved the architectural design where such design already 
existed, and strongly contributed to the parts that were 
undefined at the start of the analysis. Such as the data flow 
between the world model and some control agents, and the 
responsibilities of the supervisory controller respectively. 
The part that we perceived as the most difficult one was 
the STPA step 2. It was the most time consuming and the most 
repetitive part. The rest of the STAMP-STPA method was 
well structured, easy to follow and gave a clear picture of the 
completeness of the analysis. For step 2 however, even though 
example lists of commonly occurring causes were at the 
team’s disposal, the process would best be described as a brain 
storming session which ended when no one could come up 
with any more causes. Because of this, the completeness 
depends on a combination of expertise and imagination of the 
participants, which is the same critique other safety analysis 
methods have received. Thus, it would seem like more 
research on structuring STPA step 2 is needed. 
In general, in spite of the criticism discussed above, we 
found that STPA was well suited to our purposes and we could 
efficiently utilize it for the problem of safety analysis of the 
cooperative driving functionality. Thus, we see a good 
potential for STPA in other complex systems. 
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